Watch a 30-minute online version of an important NEW documentary:

The Third Jihad: Radical Islam's Vision for America

Robert Hanssen Case

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		)
					)
v.					)
					)		CRIMINAL NO.
ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN,			)
a/k/a "B"				)
a/k/a "Ramon Garcia"			)
a/k/a "Jim Baker"			)
a/k/a "G. Robertson"			)

I, Stefan A. Pluta, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1. I am presently employed as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and am assigned to the Washington Field Office in the District of Columbia. I have been employed as an FBI Special Agent for approximately 13 years. I have completed FBI training in foreign counterintelligence matters. As a result of my training and experience, I am familiar with the tactics, methods, and techniques of foreign intelligence services and their agents.

2. This affidavit is in support of applications for the following:

A) A warrant for the arrest of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN (DOB 4/18/44) for violations of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 794 (a) (Transmitting National Defense Information) and 794 (c) (Conspiracy to Commit Espionage); and

B) Search warrants for:

1) The residence of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, such premises known and described as a single family residence located at:

9414 Talisman Drive
Vienna, Virginia 22182

as more fully described in Attachment B, and which is within the Eastern District of Virginia;

2) One silver 1997 Ford Taurus, bearing VIN IFALP52U9VG211742 and Virginia license plate number ZCW9538, which is owned by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN and anticipated to be within the Eastern District of Virginia;

3) One 1993 Volkswagen van, bearing VIN WV2KC0706PH080424 and Virginia license plate number ZCW9537, which is owned by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN and anticipated to be within the Eastern District of Virginia;

4) One 1992 Isuzu Trooper, bearing VIN JACDH58W7N7903937 and Virginia license plate YRP3849, which is owned by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN and anticipated to be within the Eastern District of Virginia.

3. In my capacity as case agent assigned to this matter, I have examined documents and other records pertinent to this investigation from numerous sources. Searches and various forms of surveillance have also been conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).

I. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

4. The results of this investigation to date indicate that there is probable cause to believe that, beginning in 1985 and continuing to the present, ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN (hereinafter "HANSSEN"), a United States citizen, has conspired with officers and agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter "USSR" or "Soviet Union") and with its principal successor state, the Russian Federation (hereinafter "Russia") to commit espionage against the United States on behalf of a foreign government, specifically the Soviet Union or Russia, and has in fact engaged in such espionage.

5. The evidence establishes that between 1985 and the present, HANSSEN — who the KGB/SVR referred to as "B" — has engaged in the following conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§794 (a) and (c):

(a) He compromised numerous human sources of the United States Intelligence Community. Three of these sources were compromised by both HANSSEN and former CIA officer Aldrich Ames, resulting in their arrest, imprisonment and, as to two individuals, execution. HANSSEN compromised these three individuals expressly in order to enhance his own security and enable him to continue spying against the United States.

(b) He compromised dozens of United States Government classified documents, including documents concerning the National MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) Program (classified TOP SECRET/SCI), the United States Double Agent Program (classified SECRET), the FBI Double Agent Program (classified TOP SECRET), the United States Intelligence Community's Comprehensive Compendium of Future Intelligence Requirements (classified TOP SECRET), a study concerning KGB recruitment operations against the CIA (classified SECRET), an assessment of the KGB's effort to gather information concerning certain United States nuclear programs (classified TOP SECRET), a CIA analysis of the KGB's First Chief Directorate (classified SECRET), a highly classified and tightly restricted analysis of the foreign threat to a specific named highly compartmented classified United States Government program (classified TOP SECRET/SCI), and other classified documents of exceptional sensitivity.

(c) He compromised United States Intelligence Community technical operations of extraordinary importance and value. This included specific electronic surveillance and monitoring techniques and precise targets of the United States Intelligence Community. In one case, he compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United States Government. In several other cases, he compromised the United States Intelligence Community's specific communications intelligence capabilities, as well as several specific targets.

(d) He compromised numerous FBI counterintelligence investigative techniques, sources, methods and operations, and FBI operational practices and activities targeted against the KGB/SVR. He also advised the KGB/SVR as to specific methods of operation that were secure from FBI surveillance and warned the KGB/SVR as to certain methods of operation which were subject to FBI surveillance.

(e) He disclosed to the KGB the FBI's secret investigation of Felix Bloch, a Foreign Service Officer, for espionage, which led the KGB to warn Bloch that he was under investigation, and completely compromised the investigation.

(f) HANSSEN's conspiratorial activities continue to the present. HANSSEN continues to monitor a particular SVR signal site, doing so on numerous occasions in December 2000, January 2001 and February 2001. A recent search of HANSSEN's personal vehicle, pursuant to court authorization, disclosed a number of classified SECRET documents, entries in a personal journal concerning matters related to the instant investigation, and items typically used to mark signal sites. It has also been determined that HANSSEN continues to attempt to ascertain whether he has become the subject of FBI investigative interest, including checking FBI records to determine whether there have been recent entries as to his own name, his home address, or the signal site.

(g) Over the course of HANSSEN's espionage activities, he communicated on numerous occasions with KGB/SVR personnel. This Affidavit cites 27 letters he sent to the KGB/SVR, and it describes 33 packages the KGB/SVR left for HANSSEN at secret locations, and 22 packages HANSSEN left for the KGB/SVR at secret locations. The Affidavit also describes two telephone conversations HANSSEN had with KGB personnel. The Affidavit describes 26 computer diskettes that HANSSEN passed to the KGB/SVR, containing additional disclosures of information, and 12 diskettes that the KGB/SVR passed to "B". HANSSEN provided the KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of documentary material.

(h) For his services to the KGB/SVR, HANSSEN was paid over $600,000 in cash and diamonds. In addition, the KGB/SVR placed funds in escrow in a Moscow bank on HANSSEN's behalf. Some time in the last two years, the KGB/SVR informed HANSSEN that the escrowed funds are now worth at least $800,000.

II. KEY TERMS AND ENTITIES

6. The term counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons.

7. The KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvenoy Bezopasnosti, or Committee for State Security) was the intelligence service of the former Soviet Union. The KGB's First Chief Directorate (FCD) was responsible for foreign intelligence, active measures, and counterintelligence. KGB FCD intelligence officers assigned to Soviet diplomatic missions could be assigned to Line KR (Foreign Counterintelligence), Line N (Illegals Operations), Line PR (Political), or Line X (Science and Technology), among others. The KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD) was responsible, among other things, for domestic counterintelligence, that is, counterintelligence activities within the Soviet Union. The KGB's Moscow headquarters was referred to as the Moscow Centre.

8. Since December 1991, the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossii, or Russian Foreign Intelligence Service) has been the Russian Federation's successor agency to the KGB's foreign intelligence arm.

9. The GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvateinoye Upravlenie, or Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) was the military intelligence agency of the former Soviet Union, and continues to serve that function for the Russian Federation.

10. The Soviet/Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., is located at 1125 16th Street, N.W.; the Soviet/Russian Diplomatic-Compound is located at 2650 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. The KGB/SVR presence in a Soviet/Russian diplomatic mission is called the Rezidentura. headed by the KGB/SVR Rezident.

11. An agent-in-place is a person who remains in a position while acting under the direction of a hostile intelligence service, so as to obtain current intelligence information. It is also called a recruitment-in-place.

12. An illegal is an intelligence officer or a recruited agent who operates in a foreign country in the guise of a private person, and is often present under false identity.

13. A double agent is an agent engaged in clandestine activity for two or more intelligence services who provides information about one service to another.

14. A dead drop is a prearranged hidden location used for the clandestine exchange of packages, messages, and payments, which avoids the necessity of an intelligence officer and an agent being present at the same time.

15. A signal site is a prearranged fixed location, usually in a public place, on which an agent or intelligence officer can place a predetermined mark in order to alert the other to operational activity. Such a mark may be made by, for example, chalk or a piece of tape. The operational activity signaled may be the fact that a dead drop has been "loaded" and is ready to be "cleared." A call-out signal may be used to trigger a contact between an agent and an intelligence officer.

16. An accommodation address is a "safe" address, not overtly associated with intelligence activity, used by an agent to communicate with the intelligence service for whom he working.

17. The FBI has documented the use by the KGB/SVR of agents-in-place, illegals, double agents, dead drops, signal sites, call-out signals, and accommodation addresses, including their use in the Northern Virginia area, in the Eastern District of Virginia.

18. The United States Intelligence Community is the aggregation of those Executive Branch entities and programs that, in accordance with applicable United States law and the provisions of Executive Order 12333, conduct intelligence activities that are necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States, and that make up the total national intelligence effort. It includes the FBI's National Security Division, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State (DOS/INR), and the intelligence elements of the military service branches, among other entities.

19. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Title 50, United States Code, Sections 1801-1811 and 1821-1829, provides for electronic surveillance and searches within the United States directed at persons for whom there is probable cause to believe they are knowingly engaged in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, as authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).

20. Aldrich Hazen Ames is a former CIA officer who in 1994 was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to having committed espionage as an agent of the KGB and SVR. Ames volunteered to the KGB in April 1985, and provided information to the KGB and the SVR until the date of his arrest in February 1994.

21. Classified information is defined by Executive Order 12958 and its predecessor orders (including E.O. 12356), as follows: information in any form that (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls within one or more of the categories set forth in Section 1.5 of the Order (including intelligence sources or methods, cryptology, military plans, and vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security), and (3) is classified by an original classification authority who determines that its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security. Where such unauthorized release could reasonably result in "serious" damage, the information may be classified as SECRET. Where such damage is "exceptionally grave," the information may be classified TOP SECRET. Access to classified information at any level may be further restricted through compartmentation in SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) categories. Dissemination of classified information at any level may also be restricted through caveats such as: NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals), NOCONTRACT (Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants), WNINTEL (Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved), and ORCON (Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator).

III. BACKGROUND OF ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN

22. ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN was born on April 18, 1944, in Chicago, Illinois, where he was raised. He is a United States citizen.

23. HANSSEN received an AB degree in Chemistry from Knox College, in Illinois, in 1966. He studied dentistry at Northwestern University, in Chicago, Illinois, from 1966 to 1968, and received an MBA degree in Accounting and Information Systems from Northwestern University in 1971. He became a Certified Public Accountant in 1973.

24. From 1971 to 1972, HANSSEN was employed as a junior accountant at an accounting firm in Chicago, Illinois. In 1972, HANSSEN joined the Chicago Police Department as an investigator in the Financial Section of the Inspection Services Division.

25. HANSSEN studied the Russian language during college.

A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES

26. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN entered on duty as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has served as an FBI Special Agent continuously since that date.

27. After initial training, HANSSEN was assigned to the FBI Field Office in Indianapolis, Indiana, and served on a White Collar Crime squad at the Resident Agency in Gary, Indiana, until August 1, 1978.

28. From August 2, 1978 to January 10, 1981, HANSSEN was assigned to the FBI Field Office in New York, New York, initially working on accounting matters in the Field Office's criminal division.

29. In March 1979, HANSSEN was detailed to the New York Field Office's intelligence division to help establish the FBI's automated counterintelligence data base in that office. At that time, this was a new automated database of information about foreign officials, including intelligence officers, assigned to the United States. Its contents were classified up to the SECRET level.

30. From January 12, 1981, to September 22, 1985, HANSSEN was assigned to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., as a Supervisory Special Agent in the Intelligence Division. From January 1981 to August 1983, HANSSEN was assigned to the Budget Unit, which managed the FBI's portion of the United States Intelligence Community' s National Foreign Intelligence Program, and prepared budget justifications to Congress. This office had access to the full range of information concerning intelligence and counterintelligence activities involving FBI resources. From August 1983 until September 1985, HANSSEN was assigned to the Soviet Analytical Unit, which supported FBI FCI operations and investigations involving Soviet intelligence services, and provided analytical support to senior FBI management and the Intelligence Community.

While at FBI Headquarters, HANSSEN was assigned to the intelligence component of a particular highly-compartmented classified United States Government program. He also served on the FBI's FCI Technical Committee, which was responsible for coordinating technical projects relating to FCI operations.

31. From September 23, 1985, to August 2, 1987, HANSSEN was assigned to the intelligence division of the FBI Field Office in New York, New York, as supervisor of an FCI squad.

32. From August 3, 1987, to June 24, 1990, HANSSEN was reassigned to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., where he again served as a Supervisory Special Agent in the Intelligence Division's Soviet Analytical Unit.

33. From June 25, 1990, to June 30, 1991, HANSSEN was assigned to the FBI Headquarter' s Inspections Staff as an Inspector's Aide. In this assignment he traveled to FBI Field Offices, Resident Agencies, and FBI Legal Attache offices in United States Embassies abroad.

34. On July 1, 1991, HANSSEN returned to the Intelligence Division at FBI Headquarters, where he served for six months in the Soviet Operations Section as a program manager in the unit responsible for countering efforts by the Soviets (and particularly the KGB's Line X) to acquire United States scientific and technical intelligence.

35. From January 6, 1992, to April 11, 1994, HANSSEN served as Chief of the National Security Threat List (NSTL) Unit in the Intelligence Division (renamed the National Security Division, or NSD, in 1993) at FBI Headquarters. There he focused the Unit's efforts on economic espionage.

36. In April 1994, HANSSEN was temporarily assigned to the FBI's Washington Metropolitan Field Office (now called Washington Field Office).

37. In December 1994, HANSSEN was reassigned to FBI Headquarters, in the Office of the Assistant Director for NSD.

38. From February 12, 1995, to January 12, 2001, HANSSEN was detailed to serve as the FBI's senior representative to the Office of Foreign Missions of the United States Department of State (DOS/OFM). In that position he functioned as the head of an interagency counterintelligence group within DOS/OFM, and as FBI's liaison to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DOS/INR). His office was in an area designated Suites 106, 107 and 108 of Room 2510C of the State Department building at 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

39. Effective January 13, 2001, HANSSEN was assigned to a newly-created position in the Information Resources Division, at FBI Headquarters, in order that the FBI could more effectively monitor his daily activities without alerting him to the ongoing investigation of his activities. His current office is Room 9930 of FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

40. At no time during his employment with the FBI was HANSSEN ever authorized, directly or indirectly, to deliver, communicate, or transmit the classified information and documents described in this Affidavit to agents, officers, or employees of the KGB, SVR, or any other hostile foreign intelligence service.

B. OATHS OF OFFICE

41. On January 12, 1976, upon entering service with the FBI, HANSSEN signed an Oath of Office in which he swore that:

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

42. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN also signed the FBI Pledge for Law Enforcement Officers, in which he pledged, in part, as follows:

Humbly recognizing the responsibilities entrusted to me, . . . . I accept the obligation in connection with my assignments to . . . consider the information, coming into my knowledge by virtue of my position as a sacred trust, to be used solely for official purposes. . . . In the performance of my duties and assignments, I shall not engage in unlawful and unethical practices .. .. While occupying the status of a law enforcement officer or at any other time subsequent thereto, I shall not seek to benefit personally because of my knowledge of any confidential matter which has come to my attention. I am aware of the serious responsibilities of my office and in the performance of my duties . . . I shall wage vigorous warfare against the enemies of my country, of its laws, and of its principles; . . . I shall always be loyal to my duty, my organization, and my country.

43. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN also signed an Employment Agreement in which he stated, in part:

I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;

(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. . . .

(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

C. SECURITY CLEARANCES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

44. HANSSEN received his initial TOP SECRET security clearance on January 12, 1976, and has held various SCI accesses since his initial SCI indoctrination on June 23, 1980.

45. On June 23, 1980, HANSSEN signed a Nondisclosure Agreement for Sensitive Compartmented Information, in which he acknowledged receiving a security indoctrination for a particular SCI program, and further acknowledged, among other things:

3. I have been advised that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of the designated Sensitive Compartmented Information by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States, and be used to advantage by a foreign nation. . . .

4. In consideration of being granted access to the designated Sensitive Compartmented Information, I pledge that I will never divulge such information, in any form or any manner, to anyone who is not authorized to receive it, without prior written authorization from an appropriate official of the United States Government.

5. I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of the designated Sensitive Compartmented Information by me may be a substantial violation of this agreement, and may result in the termination of my employment. In addition, I have been advised that any such unauthorized disclosure by me may constitute violations of United States civil or criminal laws, including, as to the latter, the provisions of Sections 793, 794, and 798, Title 18, United States Code, and of Section 783, Title 50, United States Code. . . . I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available Sections 793, 794, 798, and 1001 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783 of Title 50, United States Code, Executive Order 12065, as amended and the Information Security Oversight Office Directive of 2 October 1978, as amended, which implements this Executive Order, so that I may read them at any time, if I so choose. . . .

I make this agreement without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

HANSSEN signed further iterations of this SCI Nondisclosure Agreement, in order to have access to additional SCI program information, on the following dates: October 1, 1981; March 1, 1982; September 9, 1983; April 10, 1985; and May 31, 1991.

46. On October 15, 1984, HANSSEN signed a Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement in which he stated, in part:

1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. . . .

2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information . . . .

3. I have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge such information unless I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it or I have been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency . . . last granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

4. . . . I have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation or violations of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, United States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation. . . .

10. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b) of Title 50, United States Code, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, and Executive Order 12356, so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.

D. RESIDENCES

47. From 1981 until 1985, HANSSEN owned a house and resided with his family on Whitecedar Court in Vienna, Virginia.

48. In approximately August 1987, after returning from his tour of duty in New York City, HANSSEN purchased a residence at 9414 Talisman Drive in Vienna, Virginia, where he and his family have lived continuously since.

IV. BASIS FOR THE INFORMATION IN THIS AFFIDAVIT

49. This Affidavit is based on numerous different types and sources of information, including the following:

A. Letters, and other forms of communications from "B" to the KGB/SVR, and from the KGB/SVR to "B";

B. A recording of a telephone conversation between "B" and a KGB/SVR officer;

C. Computer media, including hard drives and storage devices;

D. The actual plastic material that constituted the inner wrapping of a package that "B" passed to the KGB/SVR;

E. Information provided by former KGB/SVR personnel;

F. Records of the FBI, the CIA, and other agencies of the United States Intelligence Community;

G. The contents of an actual package that the KGB/SVR passed to "B";

H. Forensic testing and examination;

I. Interviews;

J. Physical searches and electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI pursuant to FISC authority;

K. Public records;

L. Other law enforcement and intelligence techniques, sources and methods; and

M. KGB/SVR operational and production files.

V. THE KGB's "B" OPERATION

50. The sources of information described in the foregoing section have established the following regarding "B":

51. On or about October 4, 1985, a KGB Line PR officer in Washington, D.C., named Viktor M. Degtyar, received an envelope by mail, at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope was postmarked "Prince George's Co, MD" on October 1, 1985. Inside was an inner envelope, marked: "DO NOT OPEN. TAKE THIS ENVELOPE UNOPENED TO VICTOR I. CHERKASHIN." At that time, Viktor Ivanovich Cherkashin was the Line KR Chief at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Inside the inner envelope was an unsigned typed letter from the person whom the KGB came to call "B." The letter read in part as follows:

DEAR MR. CHERKASHIN:


SOON, I WILL SEND A BOX OF DOCUMENTS TO MR. DEGTYAR. THEY ARE FROM CERTAIN OF THE MOST SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED PROJECTS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL ARE ORIGINALS TO AID IN VERIFYING THEIR AUTHENTICITY. PLEASE RECOGNIZE FOR OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS THAT THERE ARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THIS ARRAY OF CLEARANCES. AS A COLLECTION THEY POINT TO ME. I TRUST THAT AN OFFICER OF YOUR EXPERIENCE WILL HANDLE THEM APPROPRIATELY. I BELIEVE THEY ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A $100,000 PAYMENT TO ME.


I MUST WARN OF CERTAIN RISKS TO MY SECURITY OF WHICH YOU MAY NOT BE AWARE. YOUR SERVICE HAS RECENTLY SUFFERED SOME SETBACKS. I WARN THAT MR. BORIS YUZHIN (LINE PR, SF), MR. SERGEY MOTORIN, (LINE PR, WASH.) AND MR. VALERIY MARTYNOV (LINE X, WASH.) HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY OUR "SPECIAL SERVICES."

"B" proceeded to describe in detail a particular highly sensitive and classified information collection technique. In addition, "TO FURTHER SUPPORT MY BONA FIDES" he provided specific closely-held items of information regarding then-recent Soviet detectors. "B" added:

DETAILS REGARDING PAYMENT AND FUTURE CONTACT WILL BE SENT TO YOU PERSONALLY. . . . MY IDENTITY AND ACTUAL POSITION IN THE COMMUNITY MUST BE LEFT UNSTATED TO ENSURE MY SECURITY. I AM OPEN TO COMMO SUGGESTIONS BUT WANT NO SPECIALIZED TRADECRAFT. I WILL ADD 6, (YOU SUBTRACT 6) FROM STATED MONTHS, DAYS AND TIMES IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OF OUR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS.

The information concerning the FBI's recruitment of Yuzhin, Motorin, and Martynov was classified at least at the SECRET level, as was the defector information. The sensitive information collection technique described above was classified at the TOP SECRET level.

52. Valeriy Fedorovich Martynov was a KGB Line X officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from October 1980 to November 1985. In April 1982, the FBI recruited Martynov to serve as an agent-in-place, and he was debriefed jointly by the FBI and the CIA. Martynov was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" in October 1985, as described above. Based in part on the information provided by "B", the KGB directed Martynov to return to Moscow in November 1985, ostensibly to accompany KGB officer Vitaliy Yurchenko, who was returning to the Soviet Union after his August 1985 defection to the United States. Upon arriving in Moscow on or about November 7, 1985, Martynov was arrested, and he was subsequently tried on espionage charges. Martynov was convicted and executed.

53. Sergey Mikhailovich Motorin was a KGB Line PR officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C., from June 1980 to January 1985. In January 1983, the FBI recruited Motorin to serve as an agent-in-place, and he was debriefed by the FBI. Motorin returned to Moscow at the end of his tour of duty in January 1985. Motorin, like Martynov, was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" in October 1985, as described above. Based in part on the information "B" gave the KGB, Motorin was arrested in November or December 1985, tried and convicted on espionage charges during the period of October-November 1986, and executed in February 1987.

54. Boris Nikolayevich Yuzhin was a KGB Line PR officer assigned to San Francisco under cover as a student from 1975 to 1976, and then as a TASS correspondent from 1978 to 1982. The FBI recruited him to serve as an agent-in-place, and debriefed him. After returning to the Soviet Union, Yuzhin became the subject of an internal KGB investigation. Yuzhin was compromised to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by "B" in October 1985. Based in part on the information "B" gave the KGB, Yuzhin was arrested in December 1986, convicted of espionage, and sentenced to serve 15 years in prison. In 1992, he was released under a general grant of amnesty to political prisoners, and subsequently emigrated to the United States.

55. On or about October 15, 1985, Degtyar received by mail, at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, a package from "B" containing a large number of classified documents, including some original documents, of the United States Intelligence Community.

56. At 8:35 am on October 16, 1985, FBI surveillance personnel observed Degtyar arriving at the Soviet Embassy carrying a large black canvas bag which he did not typically carry.

57. Thereafter, Degtyar received by mail, at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, a typed message from "B," in an envelope bearing a handwritten address and postmarked "New York, NY" on October 24, 1985. The message included the following text:

DROP LOCATION

Please leave your package for me under the corner (nearest the street) of the wooden foot bridge located just west of the entrance to Nottoway Park. (ADC Northern Virginia Street Map, #14, D3)

PACKAGE PREPARATION

Use a green or brown plastic trash bag and trash to cover a waterproofed package.

SIGNAL LOCATION

Signal site will be the pictorial "pedestrian-crossing" signpost just west of the main Nottoway Park entrance on Old Courthouse Road. (The sign is the one nearest the bridge just mentioned.)

SIGNALS

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive tape meaning I am ready to receive your package.

Your signal to me: One horizontal mark of white adhesive tape meaning drop filled.

My signal to you: One vertical mark of white adhesive tape meaning I have received your package.

(Remove old tape before leaving signal.)

The message established a date and times for the signals and drops, and concluded: "I will acknowledge amount with my next package."

The KGB designated this dead drop site by the codename "PARK". It is located in Fairfax County, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia.

58. On Saturday, November 2, 1985, the KGB loaded the "PARK" dead drop site with $50,000 in cash and a message proposing procedures for future contacts with "B".

59. On or about November 8, 1985, Deglyar and Cherkashin received a typed letter from "B", which read in part as follows:

Thank you for the 50,000.

I also appreciate your courage and perseverance in the face of generically reported bureaucratic obstacles. I would not have contacted you if it were not reported that you were held in esteem within your organization, an organization I have studied for years. I did expect some communication plan in your response. I viewed the postal delivery as a necessary risk and do not wish to trust again that channel with valuable material. I did this only because I had to so you would take my offer seriously, that there be no misunderstanding as to my long-term value, and to obtain appropriate security for our relationship from the start.

"B" then rejected the contact plans proposed by the KGB, and suggested a particular communications scheme based on "a microcomputer 'bulletin board'" at a designated location, with "appropriate encryption." Meanwhile, he wrote: "Let us use the same site again. Same timing. Same signals." "B" proposed that the next dead drop occur on "September 9" which, according to the "6" coefficient that he established with the KGB in his first letter, actually meant that the dead drop operation would take place on March 3, 1986.

"B" also wrote:

As far as the funds are concerned, I have little need or utility for more than the 100,000. It merely provides a difficulty since I can not spend it, store it or invest it easily without triping [sic] "drug money" warning bells. Perhaps some diamonds as security to my children and some good will so that when the time comes, you will accept by [sic] senior services as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I would appreciate an escape plan. (Nothing lasts forever.)

Referring to Yuzhin, Motorin, and Martynov, whom he had identified in his first letter as United States intelligence recruitments, "B" wrote:

I can not provide documentary substantiating evidence without arousing suspicion at this time. Never-the-less, it is from my own knowledge as a member of the community effort to capitalize on the information from which I speak. I have seen video tapes of debriefings and physically saw the last, though we were not introduced. The names were provided to me as part of my duties as one of the few who needed to know. You have some avenues of inquiry. Substantial funds were provided in excess of what could have been skimmed from their agents. The active one has always (in the past) used a concealment device -- a bag with bank notes sewn in the base during home leaves.

In conclusion, "B" warned of a "new technique" used by NSA, which he described.

60. On March 3, 1986, the KGB loaded dead drop site "PARK", but "B" did not appear and the KGB removed its package from the dead drop site the same day.

61. On or about June 30, 1986, Deglyar received a typed letter from "B" at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. The letter read in part as follows:

I apologize for the delay since our break in communications. I wanted to determine if there was any cause for concern over security. I have only seen one item which has given me pause. When the FBI was first given access to Victor Petrovich Gandarev, they asked . . . if Gundarev knew Viktor Cherkashin. I thought this unusual. I had seen no report indicating that Viktor Cherkashin was handling an important agent, and here-to-fore he was looked at with the usual lethargy awarded Line Chiefs. The question came to mind, are they somehow able to monitor funds, ie., to know that Viktor Cherkashin received a large amount of money for an agent? I am unaware of any such ability, but I might not know that type of source reporting.

"B" then described a United States Intelligence Community technical surveillance technique. He concluded:

If you wish to continue our discussions, please have someone run an advertisement in the Washington Times during the week of 1/12/87 or 1/19/87, for sale, "Dodge Diplomat, 1971, needs engine work, $1000." Give a phone number and time-of-day in the advertisement where I can call. I will call and leave a phone number where a recorded message can be left for me in one hour. I will say, "Hello, my name is Ramon. I am calling about the car you offered for sale in the Times." You will respond, "I'm sorry, but the man with the car is not here, can I get your number." The number will be in Area Code 212. I will not specify that Area Code on the line.

"B" signed the letter: "Ramon".

According to the established "6" coefficient, the weeks the advertisement was actually to run were July 6, 1986, or July 13, 1986.

62. Viktor Gundarev was a KGB Line KR officer who defected to the United States on February 14, 1986. A classified FBI debriefing report, dated March 4, 1986, reports that FBI debrief ers showed Gundarev a photo of Cherkashin and asked if he knew Cherkashin.

63. The following advertisement appeared in the Washington Times from July 14, 1986, to July 18, 1986:

DODGE - '71, DIPLOMAT, NEEDS ENGINE WORK, $1000. Phone (703) 451-9780 (CALL NEXT Mon., Wed., Fri. 1 p.m.)

64. The number 703/451-9780 at that time belonged to a public telephone located in the vicinity of the Old Keene Mill Shopping Center, in Fairfax County, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. On Monday, July 21, 1986, "B" called that number and gave the number 628-8047. The call was taken by Aleksandr Kirillovich Fefelov, a KGB officer assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.

65. One hour later, Fefelov telephoned 212/628-8047 and told "B" that the KGB had loaded the "PARK" dead drop site. The KGB mistakenly placed the package under the wrong corner of the wooden footbridge at the "PARK" site.

66. On or about August 7, 1986, Degtyar received a letter from "B" slating that he had not found the package at the dead drop site, and indicating that he would phone 703/451-9780 on August 18, 20, or 22. The KGB then retrieved its package from the "PARK" dead drop site.

67. On Monday, August 18, 1986, "B" telephoned 703/451-9780, and spoke with Fefelov. The latter portion of the conversation was recorded as follows: ([UI] = unintelligible)

"B": Tomorrow morning?

FEFELOV: Uh, yeah, and the car is still available for you and as we have agreed last time, I prepared all the papers and I left them on the same table. You didn't find them because I put them in another corner of the table.

"B": I see.

FEFELOV: You shouldn't worry, everything is okay. The papers are with me now.

"B": Good.

FEFELOV: I believe under these circumstances, mmmm, it's not necessary to make any changes concerning the place and the time. Our company is reliable, and we are ready to give you a substantial discount which will be enclosed in the papers. Now, about the date of our meeting. I suggest that our meeting will be, will take place without delay on February thirteenth, one three, one p.m. Okay? February thirteenth.

"B": [UI] February second?

FEFELOV: Thirteenth. One three.

"B": One three.

FEFELOV: Yes. Thirteenth. One p.m.

"B": Let me see if I can do that. Hold on.

FEFELOV: Okay. Yeah.

[pause]

"B": [whispering] [UI]

FEFELOV: Hello? Okay.

[pause]

"B": [whispering] Six .... Six ....

[pause]

"B": That should be fine.

FEFELOV: Okay. We will confirm you, that the papers are waiting for you with the same horizontal tape in the same place as we did it at the first time.

"B": Very good.

FEFELOV: You see. After you receive the papers, you will send the letter confirming it and signing it, as usual. Okay?

"B": Excellent.

FEFELOV: I hope you remember the address. Is . . . if everything is okay?

"B": I believe it should be fine and thank you very much.

FEFELOV: Heh-heh. Not at all. Not at all. Nice job. For both of us. Uh, have a nice evening, sir.

"B": Do svidaniya.

FEFELOV: Bye-bye.

According to the established "6" coefficient, the operation discussed in this conversation was actually scheduled to occur on August 19, 1986, at 7:00 am.

The KGB then loaded the "PARK" dead drop site with $10,000 in cash, as well as: proposals for two additional dead drop sites to be used by "B" and the KGB; a new accommodation address codenamed "NANCY"; and emergency communications plans for "B" to personally contact KGB personnel in Vienna, Austria. The "NANCY" address was the residence of KGB Line PR officer Boris M. Malakhov in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, who was to become Degtyar's replacement as the Soviet Embassy press secretary. "B" was instructed to mis-spell Malakhov's name as "Malkow." "B" subsequently cleared the dead drop.

68. Thereafter, Degtyar received an envelope at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a handwritten address and return address: "Ramon Garcia, 125 Main St, Falls Church VA." It was postmarked from "NO VA MSC 22081" on August 19, 1986. MSC designates the Merrifield Service Center, located in the Eastern District of Virginia. Inside the envelope was a handwritten note: "RECEIVED $10,000. RAMON."

69. On or about September II, 1987, Malakhov received an envelope at his residence in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a handwritten address to "B.N. MALKOW" at the "NANCY" address, and a handwritten return address of "R. GARCIA, 125 MAIN ST, ALEXANDRIA, VA", and was postmarked September 8, 1987. Inside was the following typed letter:

Dear Friends:
No, I have decided. It must be on my original terms or not at all. I will not meet abroad or here. I will not maintain lists of sites or modified equipment. I will help you when I can, and in time we will develop methods of efficient communication. Unless a [sic] see an abort signal on our post from you by 3/16, I will mail my contact a valuable package timed to arrive on 3/18. I will await your signal and package to be in place before 1:00 pm on 3/22 or alternately the following three weeks, same day and time. If my terms are unacceptable then place no signals and withdraw my contact. Excellent work by him has ensured this channel is secure for now. My regards to him and to the professional way you have handled this matter.

 

sincerely,
Ramon

According to the established "6" coefficient, the dates referred to in this letter were actually September 10, 12, and 16.

70. On Monday, September 14, 1987, the KGB received in the mail a package of documents including TOP SECRET National Security Council documents.

71. On Tuesday, September 15, 1987, the KGB loaded the "PARK" dead drop site with $10,000 cash. The KGB also proposed two additional dead drop sites, one codenamed "AN" located in Ellanor C. Lawrence Park in Western Fairfax County, in the Eastern District of Virginia, and another codenamed "DEN" at a different location farther away. The KGB proposed that "B" load the dead drop at "PARK" or "AN" on September 26, 1987, and that the KGB respond by loading "DEN".

72. On Wednesday, September 16, 1987, the KGB determined that "B" had cleared the "PARK" dead drop and removed the signal 73. On September 26, 1987, the KGB recovered from the "PARK" dead drop site a package from "B". The package contained a handwritten letter reading as follows:

My Friends:
Thank you for the $10,000.
I am not a young man, and the commitments on my time prevent using distant drops such as you suggest. I know in this I am moving you out of your set modes of doing business, but my experience tells me the [sic] we can be actually more secure in easier modes.

"B" then suggested an exchange procedure involving a parked car instead of a dead drop site, and a related communications procedure, but stated: "If you cannot do this I will clear this once ‘AN' on your scheduled date (rather than the other)." He then asked the KGB to "Find a comfortable Vienna VA signal site to call me to an exchange any following Monday." He closed the letter, "Good luck with your work", and signed it "Ramon."

The package also contained a document which the KGB described as having the title which roughly translates into English as: "National Intelligence Program for 87".

74. Thereafter, the KGB proposed to "B" a signal site in Vienna, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, on the post of a stop sign on the shoulder of Courthouse Road near its junction with Locust Street. This signal site was referred to as "V".

75. On September 29, 1987, the KGB deposited $100,000 into an escrow account established for "B" in a Soviet bank in Moscow.

76. On November 10, 1987, Malakhov received a letter from "B" at his residence in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "J. Baker" in "Chicago" and was postmarked on November 7, 1987. In the letter, "B" advised that Saturday for "AN" was not suitable, and he postponed the operation for two days, until Monday, November 16. He advised that he had an urgent package for the KGB, and asked the KGB to place a signal confirming receipt of the letter. That same day, the KGB placed a signal at the "PARK" signal site.

Thereafter, whenever "B" used the word "Chicago" in a return address, it was to signal that he intended for a dead drop exchange to occur the following Monday.

77. On Sunday, November 15, 1987, the KGB loaded the "AN" dead drop site with a package. It was not cleared by "B" and, on November 17, the KGB removed the package.

78. On Thursday, November 19, 1987, the KGB received a handwritten letter from "B". The envelope bore a return address of "G. Robertson" in "Houston" and was postmarked on November 17, 1987. The letter read as follows:

Unable to locate AN based on your description at night. Recognize that I am dressed in business suit and can not slog around in inch deep mud. I suggest we use once again original site. I will place my urgent material there at next AN times. Replace it with your package. I will select some few sites good for me and pass them to you. Please give new constant conditions of recontact as address to write. Will not put substantive material through it. Only instructions as usual format.

Ramon

79. On Monday, November 23, 1987, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "PARK" dead drop site. The package from "B" to the KGB contained: a cable-type report about a meeting in October 1987 with a valuable source, whom the KGB referred to as "M"; a survey of information provided by Vitaliy Yurchenko; and an official technical document describing COINS-II.

In 1987, COINS-II was the then-current version of the United States Intelligence Community's "Community On-Line Intelligence System," which constituted a classified Community-wide intranet.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $20,000 cash and a letter conveying "regards" from the KGB Director and advising that $100,000 had been deposited in a bank at 6-7% interest. The letter also asked "B" for a variety of specific classified information. The KGB gave "B" two new accommodation addresses and asked "B" to propose new dead drop sites.

80. On February 4, 1988, the KGB received a note from "B" at one of the new accommodation addresses it had given to "B" in the November 23, 1987, dead drop. The address was the residence of a Soviet diplomatic official known to the FBI as a KGB co-optee, located in the Eastern of Virginia. The note read simply: "OK". It was in an envelope bearing a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Langley" and postmarked in Washington, D.C., on February 3, 1988.

81. On Monday, February 8, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "PARK" dead drop site in Nottoway Park, which the KGB had now renamed "PRIME". The package from "B" to the KGB contained a typed, unsigned letter. In the letter, "B" acknowledged receipt of $20,000 and identified two additional drop sites. He then went on to provide detailed information concerning a Soviet detector, and advised the KGB that he had arranged time to review the detector's file. "A full report will follow as soon as possible." He then disclosed to the KGB certain specific information concerning the United States Intelligence Community's communication intelligence capabilities.

Enclosed with the letter was the first computer diskette "B" passed to the KGB. Also in the package from "B" were classified documents.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $25,000 cash, and a letter conveying thanks of the KGB Chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov, for the information about the valuable source "M". The KGB also asked "B" for more information about "M" and the "agent network" in New York City, and about a particular KGB officer.

On the next day, February 9, 1988, the KGB observed that the signal at "PARK/PRIME" had been removed, indicating that "B" had cleared the dead drop.

82. On March 16, 1988, the KGB received a second computer diskette from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Chicago" and was postmarked in Washington, D.C., on March 15, 1988.

83. On March 17, 1988, the KGB received a letter from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Chicago" and was postmarked in Northern Virginia on March 16, 1988. In the letter, "B" instructed the KGB to use the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site until the KGB approved the other sites.

84. On Monday, March 21, 1988, the KGB observed a signal from "B" at the "PARK/PRIME" site, but was unable to check the dead drop site because strangers were present in the park.

85. On March 26, 1988, the KGB received a third computer diskette from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Chicago" and was postmarked in Washington, D.C., on March 24, 1988. The KGB found no text on the diskette, which it referred to as "D-3".

86. On Monday, March 28, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site.

The package from "B" to the KGB included his fourth computer diskette ("D-4"), a TOP SECRET document entitled "The FBI's Double Agent Program" and a document that the KGB described as a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) document entitled "Stealth Orientation."

The package from the KGB to "B" included $25,000 cash and a letter explaining why the KGB had not been able to check the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site on March 21. In the letter, the KGB also advised it had been unable to read the diskettes "B" had passed to the KGB. The KGB asked "B" for information about codes and cryptograms, intelligence support for the Strategic Defense Initiative, submarines, and other classified material.

The next day, the KGB observed that "B" had removed the signal from the "PARK/PRIME" site, indicating he had removed the package.

87. On April 4, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Alexandria" and was postmarked in Northern Virginia, on March 31, 1988. The envelope contained a note from "B" reading: "use 40 TRACK MODE. this letter is not a signal."

The term "use 40-track mode" refers to a technical process for re-formatting a computer diskette in order to conceal data by putting the data onto specific tracks on the diskette. Unless a person uses the correct codes to decrypt such a diskette, the diskette would appear to be blank.

88. On April 6, 1988, the KGB received a package from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Fairfax" and a postmark of "MSC NO VA" (Merrifield Service Center, Northern Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia) on April 5. The package contained a fifth diskette ("D-5"). On the diskette, "B" provided what the KGB characterized as "everything" about a particular KGB officer, additional information about a KGB defector named Victor Sheymov, and information about two specific Soviet FBI recruitments. "B" also explained why the KGB had been unable to read his diskettes. "B" also asked the KGB for diamonds. The KGB subsequently purchased several diamonds for use in the "B" operation.

89. On May 24, 1988, the KGB received a letter from "B" at an accommodation address in the District of Columbia. The envelope bore a return address of "Jim Baker" in "Chicago" and was postmarked in "MSC NO VA" on May 17, 1988. With the letter was "B"'s sixth diskette ("D-6"), which contained information about a number of matters. The diskette also contained information about a specific recent FBI Soviet recruitment operation.

90. On Monday, May 30, 1988, a KGB officer arrived at the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site at 9:03 pm, three minutes after the end of the prearranged dead drop exchange period. The KGB officer saw a man who apparently removed the signal, got into hi; car, and drove away.

91. On July 15, 1988, the KGB received a letter from "B" a an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address "Chicago" and was postmarked "WDC 200" on July 13, 1988. The zip codes for Washington, D.C., begin "200". The typed letter read as follows:

I found the site empty. Possibly I had the time wrong. I work from memory. My recollection was for you to fill before 1:00 a.m. I believe Viktor Degtyar was in the church driveway off Rt. 123, but I did not know how he would react to an approach. My schedule was tight to make this at all. Because of my work, I had to synchronize explanations and flights while not leaving a pattern of absence or travel that could later be correlated with communication times. This is difficult and expensive.


I will call the number you gave me on 2/24, 2/26 or 2/28 at 1:00 a.m., EDST. Please plan filled signals. Empty sites bother me. I like to know before I commit myself as I'm sure you do also. Let's not use the original site so early at least until the seasons change. Some type of call-out signal to you when .1 have a package or when I can receive one would be useful. Also, please be specific about dates, e.g., 2/24. Scheduling is not simple for me because of frequent travel and wife. Any ambiguity multiplies the problems.


My security concerns may seem excessive. I believe experience has shown them to be necessary. I am much safer if you know little about me. Neither of us are children about these things. Over time, I can cut your losses rather than become one.

Ramon

P.S. Your "thank you" was deeply appreciated.

92. On Monday, July 18, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site.

The package from "B" contained over 530 pages of material, including:

(A) A CIA document concerning certain nuclear programs, dated approximately November 1987 classified TOP SECRET and with the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON.

(B) A DCI document entitled "Compendium of Future Intelligence Requirements: Volume II", dated September 1987, prepared by the Staff of the Intelligence Producers Council and classified TOP SECRET/SCI with the caveat NOFORN.

(C) A CIA Counterintelligence Staff Study entitled "The Soviet Counterintelligence Offensive: KGB Recruitment Operations Against CIA," dated March 1988 and classified SECRET with the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON. This document contains the following preface:

	Warning Notice			Intelligence Sources
					or Methods Involved
					(WNINTEL)

	National Security		Unauthorized Disclosure
	Information			Subject to Criminal Sanctions

and also specifically defining "NOFORN" as "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals."

(D) A TOP SECRET comprehensive historical FBI review of allegations from recruitments and detectors over a period of years that the Soviet intelligence services had penetrated the United States Intelligence Community. It identified Soviet recruitments and detectors with specificity, and describes particular information they provided. It contained the following warning:

IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THIS DOCUMENT. THE UTMOST CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN ITS HANDLING. THE CONTENTS INCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SENSITIVE SOURCE ALLEGATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF PENETRATION OF THE FBI BY THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE HIGHLY SENSITIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND METHODS. ACCESS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $25,000 cash and a letter asking for information about surveillance systems, the agent network in New York City, illegal intelligence, and several specific FBI recruitment operations. The KGB proposed two new dead drop and related signal sites. One, named "BOB", was under a footbridge in Idylwood Park, between Vienna and Falls Church, in the Eastern District of Virginia. The other, named "CHARLIE", was under a footbridge in Eakin Community Park, south of Vienna, in the Eastern District of Virginia. For these dead drop sites, the KGB instructed "B" to load the dead drops by 9:00 pm on the designated day; the KGB would clear it by 10:00 pm and load it with a package which "B" was to clear after 10:00 pm.

93. On July 31, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of Alexandria and contained a letter dated July 29 and "B"'s seventh diskette ("D-7"), which contained information on technical surveillance systems, a new recruitment in New York City, illegal intelligence, and several other specific Soviet recruitment targets.

94. On August 22, 1988, the KGB deposited $50,000 in an escrow account for "B" at a Moscow bank.

95. On September 21, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of "Chicago" and was postmarked "WDC" on September 20. The envelope contained "B"'s eighth diskette ("D-8") and a note that read: "At BOB". The diskette contained information about particular Soviet recruitment targets of the FBI.

96. On Monday, September 26, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "BOB" dead drop site.

The package from "B" contained approximately 300 pages of material, including an FBI memo about a particular individual believed at the time to be a KGB Line KR officer in New York City, information on technical means of Soviet intelligence, a transcript of a Counterintelligence Group meeting, and information on several other matters.

The package from the KGB contained a diamond valued at $24,720, and a letter advising "B" that $50,000 had been deposited in his account. The letter also expressed gratitude to "B" from the KGB Chairman (Vladimir A. Kryuchov). The letter also discussed communications procedures, security measures, a personal meeting, and passports. It also asked "B" to provide information about classified technical operations in the Soviet Union, agent network details, allies' sources, FBI programs, past cases, and a certain missile technology.

97. On December 1, 1988, the KGB received a package from "B" at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. It bore a return address of "G. Robertson, Baker's Photo" and was postmarked "WDC" on November 30, 1988. The package contained a letter and his ninth diskette ("D-9"), which contained information about a number of classified matters.

98. On Monday, December 26, 1988, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "CHARLIE" dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package from "B" contained his tenth diskette ("D-IO") and approximately 356 pages of material. On the diskette, "B" provided additional classified information. He also provided six recent National HUMINT Collection Plan (NHCP) documents, and a document whose title the KGB noted as "Soviet Armed Forces and Capabilities for Conducting Strategic Nuclear War Until the End of the 1990s."

The package from the KGB to "B" contained $10,000 cash, a second diamond, valued at $17,748, and a message in which the KGB asked "B" for additional specific information about a wide variety of classified technical and recruitment matters.

The next day, the KGB observed that the signal at the "CHARLIE" site had been removed, indicating "B" had removed the KGB's package.

99. On Tuesday, January 31, 1989, the KGB observed an emergency call-out signal at a signal site that it had issued to "B", located at the intersection of Q Street and Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. By prearrangement, the KGB immediately unloaded a package from "B" at the "BOB" dead drop site. The package contained a cable, with a note reading: "Send to the Center right away. This might be useful." Also in the package was "B"'s eleventh diskette ("D-ll"), which contained comments on the cable, as well as information on several specific individuals about whom the KGB had asked for information.

100. On Thursday, March 16, 1989, "B" marked a call-out signal site that the KGB has issued to him, located at the Taft Bridge in Northwest Washington, D.C.

101. On Monday, March 20, 1989, "B" and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "CHARLIE" dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.

"B" passed two packages to the KGB. One contained a TOP SECRET SCI document entitled "DCI Guidance for the National MASINT Intelligence Program (FY 1991-FY 2000)," prepared by the Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Committee and dated November 1988. The document bears the caveats NOFORN and NOCONTRACT, and contains the following preface:

According to its Introduction, this document contains the MASINT Committee's recommendations to the DCI for the collection, processing, and reporting of MASINT, and represents the Intelligence Community's consensus on specific MASINT objectives and studies leading to needed capabilities. Its contents are highly specific and technical. In passing this document to the KGB, "B" requested that it be returned.

The second package from "B" to the KGB contained his twelfth computer diskette ("D-12") and approximately 539 pages of materials including classified information on a variety of matters.

The KGB package to "B" contained $18,000 cash and a third diamond, valued at $11,700. It also-contained a letter that confirmed the KGB had received "B"'s packages on December 26 and January 31, discussed a personal meeting, requested new dead drop sites, and asked how to increase operational security. The KGB also asked "B" about his security precautions for the diamonds. ("B" told the KGB that he would say the diamonds came from his grandmother.) The KGB also asked for information about a wide variety of technical and operational subjects. The KGB thanked "B" for the information he provided on January 31, and asked him "for everything else that's possible."

On Tuesday, March 21, 1989, the KGB observed that the signal at "CHARLIE" had been removed, indicating that "B" had removed the KGB's package.

102. On March 24, 1989, the KGB marked the "V" signal site on Courthouse Road in Vienna, in the Eastern District of Virginia, indicating that "B" should pick up a package at the "PARK/PRIME" dead drop site the following Monday. On Monday, March 27, 1989, the KGB loaded the dead drop with the MASINT document, for return to "B", but "B" did not clear the drop.

103. In April 1989, the KGB presented several awards to KGB officers involved in the "B" operation, including the highly- coveted Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star, and the Medal for Excellent Service.

104. On Monday, May 22, 1989, after a call-out signal from "B", he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the "BOB" dead drop site, in the Eastern District of Virginia.

The package "B" passed to the KGB contained the first and third diamonds the KGB had given to him and which "B" returned for cash, and his thirteenth d